Democracy in the New Towns: The Limits
of Private Government
The Engineering News Record of December 7, 1967 reports
that private enterprise is planning a new city for rural Minnesota. The city will be self-sufficient for its 250,000 residents. It will be covered by a large dome to provide a pleasant
climate year-round. The planners are studying the feasibility
of "a new kind of corporate city administration"which might
involve selling shares in the city.1
The "New Town" movement has arrived in the United States. One
recent estimate placed the number of current new communitiesdevelopments of at least one thousand acres planned for a minimum
of three to four thousand residents and sufficient supporting facilities,
activities, and uses to constitute a complete community-at from
200 to 250.2 Not all of these communities, however, will be New
Towns in the classic sense. 3 Some are nothing more than prosaic subdivisions on a large scale; others are bedroom communities; and still
others are special purpose towns-retirement cities or recreational
communities. 4 The "true" New Town-the subject of this commentis not only large in terms of population and geographical area, 5 but
attempts to reflect the full diversity of urban life, providing a mixture
I ENINEERING NEWS

RECORD, Dec. 7, 1967, at 21.
2 NoREN, NEW TOWNS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (National

Association of Home Builders

Land Use and Development Department, 1967). Fortune estimated that over 140 New
Towns were under construction in 1966. What's New About New Towns, FORTUNE, Feb.
1966, at 158.
3 The idea of the New Town was first presented in its modem form by Ebenezer
Howard in his 1898 text now available under the title Garden Cities of To-Morrow
(1965). The movement has been kept alive in the United States by a small group of
planners and urban critics, foremost of whom have been Clarence S. Stein, author of
Toward New Towns For America (1951), and Lewis Mumford. For analyses of New
Towns in England and Canada, see L. RODWIN, THE BarrIsH NEW TOWNS POLICY (1956);
Comment, The Administration of the English New Towns Program, 1965 IWASH. U.L.Q.
17; Oberlander & Oberlander, Canada'sNew Towns, 37 PROG. ARCH. 118 (1956).
4 What's New About New Towns, FORTUNE, Feb. 1966, at 158. See also ADvISORY COmMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AND RURAL AMERICA: POLICIES FOR FU-

GROwTH 77-8 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ACIR].
5 47 developments underway in March 1968 ranged in size from 1,000 to 101,120 acres
and in predicted population from 10,000 to 600,000, with an estimated total population
of nearly 2,500,000. ACIR at 78, Table 41 (retirement communities excluded).
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of jobs, housing, and recreation which will appeal to the widest
possible range of people. 6 Nearly fifty such towns are currently being
7
developed.
Because of the number of people who will eventually live in New
Towns, the implications of the governmental arrangements being
planned for these communities are vast. Compared to the New Towns
being built around the world, the most striking thing about the
American venture is that pur New Towns are being planned and
built by entrepreneurs, with little governmental support, guidance,
or control.8 Each New Town offers its developer the opportunity to
imprint his personality 9 upon the lives and institutions of from 10,000
to 600,000 human beings. For better or for worse, the New Town developer has the power to create and mold living communities.
The belief is common today that government is "beyond the threshold of participation.-"' Commentators have called for "decentralization" and "participatory democracy."'" Cities such as New York have
already begun to experiment with these ideas in a limited way. But
if we are seeking test tubes to help us deal with the old and fundamental "problem of the appropriate unit for a democratic political
6 Such New Towns need not be independent of existing metropolitan complexes;
rather, they meet the criteria established by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations for its report on "pew communities" (supra note 4):
"[Niew communities" are large-scale developments constructed under single or
unified management, following a' fairly precise, inclusive plan and including
different types of housing, commercial and cultural facilities, and amenities sufficient to serve the residents of the community. They may provide land for industry or are accessible to industry, offer other types of employment opportunities, and may eventually achieve a considerable measure of self-sufficiency.
With few exceptions, new communities under development today are within
commuting distance of existing employment centers.
Id. at 64 (italics omitted).
7 Id. at 77.
8 The New Communities Act of 1968, P.L., 90-448, Title IV, 82 Stat. 514, which permits the Department of Hou sing and Urban Development to guarantee obligations issued by developers of new communities up to fifty million dollars per project, sets no
standards for local government. However, before making a commitment to guarantee,
the Secretary must be determine that "there is a sound internal development plan for
the new community which . . . is acceptable to the Secretary as providing reasonable
Id. at
assurances that the development will contribute to good living conditions .
§ 404.
q On the importance of the developer's personality traits and ideological beliefs, see
Kaplan, The Roles of Planner and Developer in the New Community, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q.
88.'
10 Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 Am. POL. Sc. Rv. 953, 967 (1967).
11 See, e.g., Goodwin, The Shape of American Politics, COMMENTARY, June 1967, at 25,
36-7. On the growing concern for decentralization, see Babcock & Bosselman, Citizen
Participation: A Suburban Suggestion for the Central City, g LAND-USE CONTmois 21
(1968); L: MuMFoiRD, THE UsEAN PRosRECr 20, 72 (1968).
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system," 1 2 the New Towns offer what may be our best opportunity
for experimentation. If the New Towns can do no better than create
institutions which "will produce a disastrous alienation from the
political system,"' 3 the ideal of grass-roots democracy may have reached
an insurmountable impasse.
The obstacles are impressive. As one observer concluded:
The fact is, one cannot easily imagine what kind of politics
can emerge when the New Towns have been developed. Once
the basic decisions have been built in, what will the New
Town governments decide-except perhaps the date of the

local beauty pageant, or whether to rename a few boulevards? 14
The most challenging barrier to healthy community1 5 and political
life in the New Towns, however, will not be boredom, but paternalism. With such huge corporations as Gulf Oil, Humble Oil, and Goodyear Tire and Rubber 8 entering the New Town field, the image of
company towns is not to be dismissed too easily. "Company paternalism," in fact, has proved to be the outstanding thorn in Canada's
12 Dahl, supra note 10, at 953.

13 Hanson, Washington: Are Our Counties Ready for Metropolis?, THE
TONIAN,

WASHING-

Feb. 1966, at 10, 11.

'4 Roszak, Life in the Instant Cities, TnE NATION, March 13, 1967, at 336, 340. This
is a critical description of life in Valencia and Foster City, two growing California New
Towns. See also J. JACOBs, THE D.ATh AND LIFE oF GREAT AMERICAN Chnrs 17 (1961).
15 A brief review of the "community" literature may be found in Swanson, The Concern for Community in the Metropolis, 1 URBAN AYFAiRs Q. 33 (June 1966). Note that
two important aspects of democracy in the New Towns will not be discussed in this
comment. For analyses of the interplay between a New Town and the pre-existing jurisdiction onto which it is grafted, see E. EIcH.E & M. KAPLAN, TiE CoMMUNITY BuLDEas (1967); Scott, Urban Growth Challenges New Towns, 48 PUBLIC MANAGEmENT 253
(1966); Mandelker, Some Policy Considerations in the Drafting of New Towns Legislation, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 71. On the question whether the New Towns will in fact
be able to absorb a significant number of lower-income residents, see Eicmnm & KAPLAN,
supra; Cox, Dream City (Almost), COmMONWEAL, Jan. 20, 1967, at 426; Simon, Reply to
Cox, COmMONWEAL, Mar. 3, 1967, at 631; 90th Cong., 2d Sess., House Comm. on Banking & Currency, Subcomm. on Housing, Housing and Urban Development Legislation
and Urban Insurance, Hearings on H.R. 15624, HR. 15625 and Related Bills, pt. 2, at
747 (statement by Jack Conway) and 975 (statement by James Rouse) (1968). See also
N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1967, § 8, at 1.
18 These corporations are developing Reston; Clear Lake City, Texas; and Litchfield
Park, Arizona, respectively. Westinghouse, General Electric, American-Hawaiian Steamship Lines, and a number of other corporate giants are also building New Towns. See
Ridgeway, New Cities Are Big Business, NEw REPUBaIC, Oct. 1, 1966, at 15. See also
ACIR at 80-2.
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New Town
However, unlike the Canadian New Towns
and unlike our historic company towns,' 8 our New Towns will be
multi-industrial. The threat of economic domination by the town's
largest employer is not as real as the threat of developer paternalism.
Reston, which Wolf Von Ecbardt has said "promises to be one of the
first modern communities in America worthy of the name,"'1 has already been written off by a critic as being no more than a "fiefdom.".20
This comment analyzes the problem of how New Towns are to be
governed. Focusing on two of the most publicized New TownsReston, Virginia, and Columbia, Maryland-it describes the institutions of "private government" which these towns will employ and attempts to evaluate the appropriateness of these institutions. Finally,
the comment explores the possibility that these "private governments"
may have to be altered or abolished if the requirements for equal
voting rights under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
are to be satisfied.
I. GOVERNMENT BY CONTRAT-AN OUTLINE OF THE HOMES
ASSOCIATION
The basic unit of organization in Reston and Columbia is the
"homes association" 21-an incorporated, non-profit organization that
operates under recorded land agreements for the maintenance of
private and common property and the provision of certain municipaltype services. The idea of the homes association is more than a century
old,22 but it has been used frequently only since the advent of the

suburban subdivision. In 1962, over 470 subdivisions were organized
this way. 23 The best known example of the homes association, no
doubt, has been the one installed at Radburn, New Jersey, the influential model community planned by Clarence Stein and Henry
Wright in the late 1920's.24
17 McFarland, The Administration of the Alberta New Towns Program, 5 DUQUESNE
U.L. REv. 377 (1967).
18 On the company town model of private government, see Davis, Company Towns, 4
ENCYC. OF THE SOC. SCI. 119 (1931); J. REPs, THE MAKING OF URBAN AMERICA, ch. 15
(1965); A. LINDSEY, THE PULLMAN STRInK, ch. 4 (1942).
19 The Community: Could This Be Our Town, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 7, 1964, at 17.
20 Viorst, Reston, HORIZON, Autumn 1967, at 35.
21 The best source, by far, for information on homes associations is URBAN LAND INsTrruTm, THE HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK (1964) [hereinafter citcd as ULI HANDBOOK].
22 See Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774 (1848).
23 Foreword to ULI HANDBOOK at vi.
24 For full descriptions of R'adburn by its planner and by the draftsman of the Radburn covenants, see STEIN, supra note 3; C. Ascher, Private Covenants in Urban Redevelopment, in URBAN REEVOELOPMENT: PROBLEMS AND PRACncEs 278-309 (C. Woodbury ed.
1953). The Radbum covenants are available in A. DUNHAM, MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 129-47 (2d ed. 1958).
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In communities like Radburn, Reston, and Columbia, the establishment of a homes association takes place in four steps. First, the developer prepares and records the final plat of the development. Second,
he writes and records a declaration of covenants and restrictions applicable to the entire parcel of land. This declaration becomes the
basis of the homes association, setting forth affirmative and negative
covenants, easements, liens, and charges which will bind every purchaser of the land. Third, after the declaration is recorded, the developer prepares the articles and bylaws of a homes association, and incorporates the association. Fourth, and only after the other steps have
been completed, the developer conveys sections of the land, using a
deed which confirms the rights and duties set forth in the recorded
declaration.
By the doctrine of reciprocal negative easements, 25 as soon as the
first lot is subjected to the restrictions in the recorded declaration,
the rest of the land is automatically bound by the same restrictions.
Each purchaser, therefore, has an interest in every other purchaser's
deed, and the homes association, as agent and representative of the lot
owner, 28 is the mechanism for insuring that all lot owners remain
effectively bound by the covenants and restrictions.
27
The covenants and restrictions generally run with the land;
the homes association and individual home owners have the power
to sue to enforce both affirmative promises (to pay assessments, for
example) and negative promises (such as not to build without the
approval of an architectural committee). The association owns and
manages open spaces and common property conveyed to it by the
developer and performs various services for the lot owners. The individual lot owner and his family have the right to use the association's
property, and the owner has a vote in association affairs; in return,
he and his family are obligated to pay the association's assessment
and to abide by its rules.
The homes association is a favored device for the organization of
subdivisions. Pre-existing local governments tend to approve of it
because the association performs municipal-type services, assures that
common open spaces will be permanent, and guarantees that maintenance will be paid by the benefited properties, rather than from
25 See Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 111 A.2d 855 (1955); Sanborn v. McLean, 233
Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925).
26 Merrionette Manor Homes Improvement Ass'n v. Heda, 11 Ill. App. 2d 186, 136

N.W.2d 556 (1956).
27 See Wehr v. Roland Park Co., 143 Md. 384, 122 A. 363 (1923); Dunham, Promises
Respecting the Use of Land, 8 J. LAw & ECON. 133 (1965); Note, Affirmative Duties Running With the Land, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1344 (1960).
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public funds. 28 The developer favors the homes association because
it permits him to maintain a large portion of control during the developmental period,2 9 while allowing him gradually to develop residential participation and responsibility, so that he may eventually
withdraw from the project, confident that his community-building
reputation will not be injured by the future disintegration of his work.
It can be argued that the homes association in a New Town setting
is more than a private corporation-that it is actually a unit of government similar to a municipal corporation. In fact, the descriptive
term "government by contract," which applies to Reston and Columbia, was used by Charles Ascher with reference to Radburn, 0 and it
is useful, before discussing in detail the Columbia and Reston schemes,
to turn briefly to Radburn, both as the forerunner of more recent New
Towns and as an explicit example of private government. The socalled "Green Book," which was given to prospective Radburn residents, contains the following summary:
Since the Radburn Association is undertaking activities so
much like those of a municipality, the Association has been
organized on the model of the best modern practice in municipal government, and the scheme of organization provides
for a President and Trustees (corresponding to a Mayor and
Council) who are responsible for determining the policies of
the Association; and the actual administration is placed by
the By-Laws in the hands of a Manager (corresponding to a
City Manager), who is chosen by the Trustees solely on the
basis of his executive and administrative qualifications, and
who is responsible for the carrying out of the policies of the
Trustees. 1
Early incorporation of Radburn as a municipality, had it been
politically feasible, would probably have been rejected by the planners. 2 Their intention was to insure their own influence before a
heterogeneous collection of home-purchasers had crystallized into a
28 Preface to ULI HANDBOOK at x.
29

See text accompanying notes 71-7 infra.

80

Ascher, supra note 24.
Id. at 282.

81

32 Id. at 279-80. It is not always possible for a New Town to become a municipal corporation. In Radburn's case, the legislative votes were lacking. In the case of Reston, §
15.1-785 of the Code of Virginia stands in the way. That section prohibits unincorporated communities from incorporating as a town or city within the limits of a county,
such as Reston's Fairfax County, which has adopted the urban county form of government. Columbia could theoretically incorporate as a municipality, but a long tradition of
strong counties has made municipal incorporation a rarity in Maryland.
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community, and then gradually to devolve control upon the residents. 33 Early directors were appointed by the developers; it was not
until 1938, a decade after the Radburn Association was organized, that
34
the majority of trustees were homeowners.
Clarence Stein later criticized Radburn's governmental arrangement:
The Radburn Association was to have the power and functions of a municipal government, including taxation. An
American government without public representationl Luckily
it was well-administered for the good of the Radburn people. .... 35
This paternalism is reflected in Ascher's comment that "[t]he attitude
of the trustees seems more like that of the board of directors of a
bank toward its depositors than that of a politically responsible board
36
toward its constituents.1
II. RESTON AND COLUMBIA-A DESCRIPTION
"By exciting popular interest and building their demonstration
New Towns, [developers Robert Simon, Jr. and James Rouse] have
helped to make the New Town idea familiar and acceptable to many
Americans."37 Although it would be a mistake to suppose that Reston
and Columbia are typical of all developing New Towns in America,38
the publicity they and their developers have received makes them appropriate subjects for scrutiny.
Reston and Columbia are fraternal twins, born in the middle 1960's
in the Washington, D.C. area. Each was created by a private developer
who desired to prove the workability, including the profitability, of
the New Town idea. But Simon3 9 and Rouse do not have identical
conceptions of what a New Town should be, and their ideological
differences have been emphasized by the different external forces
which have affected Reston and Columbia. Both men are determinists.
Simon tends to stress the importance of physical environment, and
consequently the emphasis at Reston has been on the quality of architectural detail. Rouse, on the other hand, stresses the importance of
33 Id. at 285-6.
34 Id.
35 STm, supra note 3, at 61.
36 Ascher, supra note 24, at 307.
37 Gallantay, Architecture, THE NA7ON, Dec. 26, 1966, at 714, 716.
38

See Kaplan, supra note 9.

39 Simon is no longer running Reston, but the institutions of concern here are his

creation.
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social interaction. As a result Columbia may appear dull and suburban
in comparison to Reston, but its environmental planning is probably
the most advanced in the country.
A. Influence of Pre-Existing Local Government
The governmental forms adopted in Reston and Columbia have
been influenced by the condition of local government in Fairfax
County, Virginia, and Howard County, Maryland, at the time the New
Towns were being planned.
Fairfax County, with 400,000 residents, operates under the Urban
County Executive Form as the result of a 1966 election. But even before this it was an urbanized county, and Simon believed that it could
provide Reston with satisfactory zoning and services. 40 This meant that
Reston itself would not have to create all of the amenities of an urban
center for its 75,000 residents.
Rouse, in planning Columbia, encountered a different situation.
Howard County is rural, with a population of only sixty thousand. Its
political leaders were not immediately receptive to the idea of an instant city of 110,000 being created within the county boundaries, nor
was the county capable of providing the variety of high quality services
Columbia would need. 41 Rouse, therefore, had to invent a system of
42
government which could service a city in most major ways.
B. Scheme of Government
Both Reston and Columbia are unincorporated subdivisions, and
both depend, though in different degrees, upon county government
for zoning and public services. Both New Towns are organized into a
dual, or federal, system of homes associations. In each. town the "central" homes association performs significant municipal-type 43 functions.
40 EICHLER & KAPLAN, supra note 15, at 156. This easy relation between county and
New Town is typical of California experience, where half of the New Towns are being
built.
41 See generally Hoppenfeld, A Sketch of the Planning-BuildingProcess for Columbia,
Maryland, 33 J. Am. INsT. PLANNERS 398 (1967).
42 Other large-scale planned communities have responded to their political circumstances in different ways. Some have managed to become annexed to existing cities.
Others have developed close ties with county government. Some have created special districts or "county service areas." See Scott, supra note 15, at 254-5.
43 "Municipal-type" functions is used in an effort to avoid begging the question of
what constitutes "public," "municipal," or "governmental" functions. For an example of
the confusion inherent in determining what functions are inherently governmental, compare the following tax cases: Allen v. Regents of the Univ. System, 304 U.S. 439 (1938)
(university athletic contest); Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352 (1937) (water works);
Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934) (elevated railroad); South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (liquor dispensary).
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The "peripheral" associations resemble the more traditional homes
associations of small subdivisions.
In Reston the central association is called the Home Owners Association. In fact, there are two of these, one located on each side of the
Dulles Airport Access Road which bifurcates the New Town. The city
will consist of seven villages, each with its own identity. Each village
will consist of several small clusters of a hundred or so homes organized
as Cluster Associations.
The central organization in Columbia is the Columbia Association.
As in Reston, Columbia's constituent villages include ten thousand to
fifteen thousand residents. But the peripheral units of organization in
Columbia, called Community Associations, serve entire villages, rather
than small clusters of homes. The Community Associations are not
only much larger than Reston's Cluster Associations, but they carry on
more activities.
C. The Central Homes Association and its Functions
1. Reston. The corporate purposes of a Reston Homes Owners
Association are
(1) to operate and maintain such property as [may be designated or conveyed to it by the developer] to be operated and
maintained by the Corporation as parks, parking areas, open
spaces, streets, paths, or as other facilities, to enforce the covenants, restrictions, reservations, servitudes, profits, licenses,
conditions, agreements, easements, and liens provided in the
Deed to be enforced by the Corporation, and to assess, collect,
and disburse the charges created under the Deed. .

.

. [and]

(2) to do any and all lawful things and acts that the Corporation, from time to time, in its discretion, may deem to be for
the benefit of the property subject to the Deed and the owners
and inhabitants thereof or advisable, proper, or convenient
for the promotion of the peace, health, comfort, safety, or
general welfare of the owners and inhabitants thereof.44
The articles of incorporation vest the management of the corporation's affairs in nine directors. The initial directors serve five years
"and until their respective successors are elected." 45 The first election
of directors by the members of the corporation is to be held this year.
All elected directors will serve three year terms.
Among the directors' powers are the fixing and collecting of annual
dues. These are limited to a maximum of one per cent of any property's
44 Articles of Incorporation of Reston First Home Owners Association, § (b).
45 Id., § (d).
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assessed valuation.4 6 The directors also annually elect the officers of
the Home Owners Association. The president is akin to a city manager,47 albeit a city manager with a somewhat limited portfolio. He
appoints advisory committees on specific fields of interest, such as
planning and budgeting, rules, regulations and enforcement, recreation, and camping.
The members of a Home Owners Association in Reston include the
developer, the owner of any lot, and
all persons residing on any portion of the Property who are
stockholders, members, or beneficiaries of or otherwise beneficially interested in, a corporation, association, trust, condominium, or other entity owning a portion of the Property
and organized and operated for the purpose of leasing or otherwise making residences on the Property . . .available to [its
48
stockholders, members, or beneficiaries].

This excludes mere lessees. The developer excepted, voting is a function of property ownership. In fact, "Any person owning a multifamily dwelling shall have the number of votes equal to the number
of apartments contained in such multi-family dwelling."4 9 If a unit is
held in joint tenancy or tenancy-in-common, the vote must be exercised by unanimous action or consent of the owners of record. Moreover, each voter must reside on the portion of property with respect
to which he is entitled to vote.50 By a formula for weighted voting,
the developer retains a minimum of one-third of the votes until 1985.51
The members of the Corporation
shall have the right to vote for the election and removal of
directors and upon such other matters with respect to which a
vote of members is required under the Deed or under the
provisions of [the non-stock corporation title of the Code of
Virginia]

52

46 Deed of Dedication, May 3, 1966, recorded in Clerk's Office of Fairfax Co., Va., in
Deed Book 2761, page 415, as Instrument No. 12582, 11(8).
47 Compare Letter from A. Jackson Lynn, Jr., Public Relations, Gulf-Reston, Inc.,
Sept. 30, 1968 to author:
Reston's Cluster and Home Owners Associations are not meant to be governmental bodies. The Associations are basically mutual maintenance groups.
Granted, some of the functions the Associations perform might be relegated to
a "Department of Parks" in a small city, but the head of the Home Owners
Association would be more nearly akin to a city manager than a mayor.
48 Articles of Incorporation, supra note 44, § (c)(2)(C).
49 Id., § (c)(3)(A).
5D Id., § (c)(3)(C). This provision appears to be in conflict with the provision cited in
the previous footnote.
51 Id., § (c)(3)(D).
52 Id., § (c)(3).
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The covenants of the deed of dedication are deemed to run with
the land. They are enforceable by the Association, the developer, or by
any record owner, in actions at law or suits in equity. Upon the violation of any covenant or restriction, the Association (or the developer
or both)
may seek an order from a court of competent jurisdiction
permitting it to enter upon the portion of the Property upon
or as to which such violation exists, and summarily to abate
or remove the same, using such force as may be reasonably
necessary, at the expense of the owner thereof.... Each purchaser . . .agrees that he shall be personally responsible for

the payment of all charges that may become liens against his
13
property ....
The covenants and restrictions continue in force until the year 2005,
and then continue automatically for periods of twenty years, unless
not less than five years prior to 2005 or any other expiration date, an
amendment or vacation of the restrictions and covenants is executed by
the holders of more than fifty per cent of the votes of the Association.54
The covenants are difficult to amend. With respect to certain basic
sections of the deed of dedication, an amendment must have the support of ninety per cent of the votes. Other amendments require either
the support of eighty per cent of the votes or, alternatively, fifty per
,cent of the votes and the approval of at least seven-ninths of the en55
tire board of directors.
In summary, the Reston Home Owners Association is a private corporation operating through an elected board of directors, with powers
to hold and maintain property, to enforce covenants and restrictions,
and to act affirmatively to provide certain local municipal-type services
which could extend to "any and all lawful things and acts... convenient for the promotion of the peace, health, comfort, safety, or general welfare of the owners and inhabitants." 56 The corporation has, in
effect, a taxing power, enforceable in the courts. Although many of the
activities of the Association will touch the daily lives of all the residents, the right to vote for directors is allocated only on the dual bases
of property ownership and residency.
2. Columbia. Columbia's planning process is distinguished by its
utilization of "work groups" of social scientists who supposedly brought
53
Inc.,
54
55
46

Deed of Dedication, supra note 46, IV(1-3). See Noremac Inc. v. Centre Hill Court,
164 Va. 151, 178 S.E. 877 (1955).
Deed of Dedication, supra note 46, IV(2-3).

Id., IV(5).
Articles of Incorporation, supra note 44.
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to Columbia the latest and best thinking on nearly every aspect of
community life. Social planners decided that "government" in a new
community should consist of many different entities, some private,
some public, some quasi-public. 57 Howard County is expected to provide police and fire departments, water, sewers, schools, snow removal,
zoning, and other services, while the Columbia Association-which
Rouse considers "a potentially important experiment in its own
right"5 8--provides all municipal services not offered by the county.
The Association is empowered to undertake the financing, construction, maintenance, and operation of roads, walkways, parks, libraries,
community service facilities, mass transportation, and energy distribution systems. 59
A Columbia Association brochure states:
It was recognized early in Columbia's planning that the new
city would need services and amenities beyond those normally provided by the existing government.... The Columbia Association is the mechanism that was developed to afford
to the residents a voice in the affairs of the city, and to provide the care, upkeep and operation of all those extras that
make Columbia a better place in which to live, work, do business, or raise a family. 60
The individual property owner as such is not a member of the
Columbia Association. The only members, technically, are the directors, who are nominated (and in effect chosen) by a unit called the
Columbia Council, whose members are elected for the sole purpose of
nominating directors. 61 Like a city council, the directors appoint a
manager to administer and run Association activities.
Each property owner or tenant is automatically a member of a
village-level Community Association, and one of his rights is to vote
for a village representative to the Columbia Council. Unlike Reston,
the vote is allocated primarily by tenancy, since both tenants and
owners may vote. The principle of "one unit-one vote," rather than
57 EICHLER & KAPLAN, supra note 15, at 66.

The Messianic Master Builder, LiFE, Feb. 24, 1967, at 40.
& KAPLAN, supra note 15, at 75-6. Columbia's Deed, Agreement, and
Declaration (recorded in the Land Records of Howard Co., Md., Liber 463, page 158)
includes a half-page of small print containing an enumeration of the projects, services,
facilities, studies, programs, systems, and properties for which the Columbia Association
may expend funds. Random examples include drainage systems, airports, zoos, hospitals,
communications systems, and facilities for the fighting and preventing of fires.
60 THE COLUMBIA ASSOCIATION TODAY (pamphlet, 1968).
61 See text at note 73, infra.
58

59 ECHLERa
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"ownership of one unit-one vote," controls.62 As in Reston, jointlyheld property yields but one unanimous vote.
The process of electing directors is complex. Each year the villages
elect representatives to the Columbia Council. The Council then
nominates from its membership a slate of candidates from which the
present directors must elect one new director for each four thousand
dwelling units in the city. If the Council only nominates one candidate for each open position, the board must elect the nominated candidates.
In most other respects, the Columbia Association is like the Reston
Home Owners Association. The annual charge set by the directors
63
cannot exceed 75 cents per one hundred dollars assessed valuation,
a lower limitation than in Reston. The restrictions run in perpetuity,
but after the year 2065, the maximum annual charge may be amended
downward to the "amount found by the Board to be necessary to produce sufficient revenue to operate, maintain, renew, replace and repair ... such facilities . .. as may be in existence on December 31,
2065... ."64 It would appear, therefore, that Columbia's organization
is not only permanent, but programmed for stagnation a hundred years
hence.
D.

The PeripheralHomes Associations and Their Functions

The Reston Cluster Associations are merely smaller homes associations. They function to maintain the parks, pathways, parking areas,
and driveways closely related to and serving the one hundred to two
hundred housing units in a cluster, acting independently of the Home
Owners Association in regard to the small parcels of property they
hold. The Cluster Association has a taxing power, presently charging
dues of one hundred to two hundred dollars a year. It is managed
by a five-man board of directors, the members of which are elected for
staggered three-year terms.6 5
While the Reston peripheral association is only the reflection of
the architects' grouping of houses, and is probably too small a unit to
engender a meaningful political life, the Columbia village association,
catering to ten thousand to fifteen thousand residents, is an integral
part of Rouse's effort to return human scale to community life.66 The
62 Harper's Choice Village Covenants, recorded in the Land Records of Howard Co.,
Md., Liber 481, page 514, art. III, § 3.02(B).
63 Deed, supra note 59, art. II, § 2.01.
64 Id., art. VI, § 6.01.
65 Prior to 1968, the directors were selected by the developer.
66 Rouse, A Garden for People to Grow In, TrrL NEws, Jan. 1966, at 88, 95.
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powers of the village association, however, are not broad; in fact, the
67
dues at this level are merely voluntary and cannot be enforced.
All owners and tenants automatically become members of their local village association. As members they elect a board of directors
which manages the association's affairs. The village association uses the
dues and assessments primarily to maintain and improve the common
property that has been deeded to it by the developer and the Columbia Association.
The limited functions and economic resources of the duster and
village associations indicate that, whatever the intentions of their planners, they will probably constitute far less significant vehicles for resident involvement in community affairs than their larger counterparts,
the central homes associations.
E. Architectural Controls
Historically, the prime reason for creating a homes association has
been to preserve property values by assuring a high standard of architecture and maintenance. Both Reston and Columbia provide for committees with the power to enforce covenants pertaining to the use of
privately owned land. Each has covenants that specify what an owner
may not do with his property, 68 and under what circumstances he must
receive approval from the architectural committee before making
changes. When the owner fails to live up to his obligations, the committee may act for him, charging him for reasonable expenses.
In Reston, there are three Architectural Review Boards, one for
each of the Home Owners Associations and a third for Reston's industrial area. The typical Board consists of six architects and two lay
members. After 1965,
members of the Board shall be appointed for terms of one
year, or until their successors are appointed, one architect
and one lay member to be appointed by the [Home Owners]
Association and the remaining members by the Developer of
Reston.0 9
In Columbia each village Architectural Committee is composed of
Harper's Choice Village Covenants, supra note 62, art. IV:
The sole remedy for nonpayment of . . . dues and assessments shall be the suspension of the delinquent member's voting rights (except with respect to the
casting of a vote for a representative to the Columbia Council) and the right to
use Association Land until such payment is made ....
68 For example, in Reston there are restrictions against air and water pollution, exposure of laundry to public view, construction of unsightly fences, and, use of gas-powered
motor boats or boats over eighteen feet long on Reston's waters.
69 Deed of Dedication, supra note 46, 1(2).
67
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thtee or more individuals dpp6inted by both the Columbia AsSdciation and the individual village asSociatiOn, with the Columbia Associa70
tion always being entitled to appbint the majority.
F. The Withering Away of the Developer
One of the most difficult problems for the community builder is to
maintain a balance between his own need for control over the developing New Town and the desirability of active participation in the community by its new residents.
Naturally, the developer wants to retain enough power so that he
may protect his interests and complete the project according to plan.
Additionally, he knows that succes or failure in the undertaking
(which usually involves an investment of more than fifty million dollars) is dependent upon the viability of the project as a living community; if he limits his own role to physical construction, uncontrolled
social and political disintegration may make even the nicest homes
unsaleable. On the other hand, the developer is aware that he will
eventually desire to withdraw from the project in order to get on with
other work, and it is in his interest to leave behind him a strong
social and political structure that Will advertise his success ds a community builder. He is awaie, moreover, that if he is too paternalistic,
the residents will become alienated and the development will suffer.
Finally, the developer is (or should be) aware that there is a psychological tendency for new residents to be open to new behavior modes for
only a short time, perhaps no more than two or three years. if their
natural interest in their neighborhood is not harnessed during this
early period, it may never be. 71 For these reasons, the Urban Land
Institute's Homes Association Handbook warns the developer that the
early establishment of membership responsibility is essential.7 2
The homes association is an intelligent mechanism for the gradual
transfer of power from the developer to the residents of a new community. By establishing the association himself, the developer is able
to retain extra voting power during the early stages of development.
By appointing the initial board of directors and officers, he can control
the early life of the association. As their number increases, the residents can be given greater responsibilities and, through the increasing
weight of their vote, exercise a larger amount of power. To assure
present and potential property owners of their eventual control, the
developer is wihe to covenant a date for his own withering away.
70 Harper's Choice Village Covenantsi supra note 62, art. VII.
71

ULI

72

Id. at 233, 241, 244. Sde id. t 341 Wotbhgigedt d ofiU61Is Igafist dbes of weighted

voting.

HANDBOOK

at 244.
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As a matter of tactics, the developer should express his intention to
retain early control and should specify the mechanism which will
guarantee his eventual withdrawal. A Columbia Association brochure
sets forth Rouse's intentions so that all residents will understand what
is happening. 3 The timetable looks like this:
1966-76--control of the Board by the developer's representatives.
1976-80-offices of original directors expire in annual stages.
1980-only elected directors remain.
It is not so dear that Restonians will ever take over from their de74
veloper. Milton Viorst has written:
To be sure, paternalism exists ....

Legally, Reston is an un-

incorporated subdivision of Fairfax County, under the jurisdiction of the county board of supervisors. In reality, it is run
by Reston, Va., Inc., Simon's personal corporation. Simon invented "duster associations," to which the residents of the
individual dusters belong, but their sovereignty is limited to
common property-walkways and grounds-which they are
contractually required to keep clean and in good repair.
Simon points out that there is indirect democracy inasmuch
as Reston votes for county supervisors. The supervisors, in
consultation with Simon, build the schools, provide police and
fire protection and make available other necessary services.
But in approving Simon's master plan, the supervisors all but
abdicated to him the prerogatives of government that will determine Reston's fate. .

.

. It is conceivable-though by no

means likely-that the residents could some day wrest control from Simon's corporation through a device called the
Home Owners Association. But for now, the Association
serves as a semi-democratic facade behind which Simon exercises power. For all practical purposes, there is no democracy
at Reston; the community is Simon's fief.
However accurate this description, it appears that Viorst is misstating the issue. If the nation is committed to the building of New Towns
by private developers free of regulation, it seems unavoidable that we
accept a developmental period during which a "'semi-democratic
facade" prevails. Indeed, the planning and construction of a New
Town is such an expensive, complicated process that there may be no
feasible way to combine a developmental period with meaningful
resident participation. The appropriate question, therefore, is not
73 THE COLUMBIA ASsoCrATION ToDAY, suPra note 60, at 15.
74 Viorst, Reston, supra note 20, at 39.
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whether democracy exists in the infant Reston, but whether it will
exist before too many years. For the short run, a rough kind of democracy of the market place exists-the resident selects his leader by
choosing to settle in the developer's new community. For the long
run, it is essential to ask whether there are built-in protections against
the developer's prolonging his term of office beyond its economic justification.
This question becomes even more important as it pertains to Reston,
because Robert Simon, an individual devoted to what he perceived to
be the New Town ideal, has been replaced by Gulf Oil, a corporation
whose spokesman says that a developer should "listen to the market '7 5
rather than to the city planners and architects. Unless the market (or
government) requires some protections for democracy, the residents of
Reston will be dependent only on the protections of their covenantsand these do not clearly define any policy of developer withdrawal.
The developer's weighted voting power, for example, continues in effect
for a long period, giving him a minimum of one-third of the votes in
the Home Owners Association until the time when his property holdings alone would give him only one-fifth of the votes; and until 1985
the developer is absolutely guaranteed one-third of the votes, even if
all the lots are sold and housing units occupied.7 6 The Architectural
Review Boards remain in the developer's control indefinitely!" Gulf
Oil already has a monopoly in Reston for some of its products, such as
gasoline; it does not stretch the imagination to see Gulf maintaining a
permanent hand in the governing of Reston.
III. THE HoMEs

ASSOCIATION IN THE

NEW

TOWN CONTEXT

The employment of the homes association idea in the context of a
New Town constitutes a break with the past. If, as some have argued,
New Towns are merely large subdivisions, few subdivisions have been
so large."" Nor have there been many examples of planned unit development7 9 which have presented the coherent, distinct, and balanced
character of a New Town. The homes association was developed in
small, homogeneous, wealthy surroundings. Only three per cent of all
existing developments with homes associations have more than five
75 Von Eckardt, Are We Being En-Guled? NEw REPuBLIC, Dec. 9, 1967, at 21, 23.
78 Deed of Dedication, supra note 46, II(7)(b).
77 Id., 1(2).
78 Even Radburn, which was planned for 25,000 residents, but was truncated by the

Depression, served only about 650 families.
79 URBAN LAN INsrum, TEciICAL BuLL. No. 40, New Approaches to Residential

Land Development (1961).
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thousand homesite.8 0 Approximately 75 per cent are in the high or
mediunm-high price range.-i And it can be assumed from a cursory look
at today's suburbs that most of these subdivision developments are
racially and ethnically homogeneous.
But the New Town will not be small, homogeneous, or even predminately wealthy, according to existing plans. Reston will have a
population of over seventy thousand; Columbia will have 110,000. The
New Town at the Irvine Ranch in Califorpia will be home for
50Q,000 people.,s Where the average home_ as5ociatiOn serves a deyelopment of between ten and one thousand acres,8 ; Reston will have
over one thousand acres of park and public land alone, Columbia will
. 4 As to wealth, both Rouse and Simon
cover fourteen thousand acresA
have expressed the ideal of a mixed populace. Rouse intends that ten
per cent of Columbia's
housing will be available to families with under
$4000 a year income.8 5 NeVes and other ninority groups will be welcome in each community. A black director has already been elected to
the board in Columbia, Finally, the New Towns will be heterogeneous
in terms of land use, especially in comparjson with the typical sliburban
subdivision in which the homes association has been used.
The most compelling disinction between the usual homes association and the Reston-Columbia homes .ssociation can be seen in terms
of function, Historically, the homes associqtion has administered covenants for architectural harmony and permanent upkeep of the neighborhood. The peripheral homes associations in Reston- and Columbia
are in this tradition. But on the centra level in Reston, and even more
so in Columbia, the homes association not only preserves property
values, but also allocates tax funds and provides municipal-type services. It is difficult to read the following annual report of the Rouse
Company, for the year ending May 31, 1968, without concluding that
the Columbia Association is more like a municipal govermuent than
a private corporation:
During the year, the Association brought into operation the
btis system, two golf corses, four swimming pools, a tennis
80- ULI HANOOK at

19.

82 New Town Rises Back at the Ranch, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 23, 1967, at 176.

83 ULI HANDBOOK at 19.
84 Volpert, Creation and Maintenance of Open Spaces in Subdivisions: Another Approach, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 830, 835 (1965), points out that the practical problems of a
homes association become "acute" when the development covers a large area and indudes a planned community containing many different land uses.
85 Rouse plans for a wide range of income levels within a village, but does not intend
to foster economic integration within the small dusters that constute the village. Hearings, supra note 15, at 985.
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club, a child-care center, a teen-agers' club, two community
buildings, more than 200 acres of parks, boating, fishing, and
skating on two lakes and a wide range of other facilities and
activities. The Association received a grant of $277,000 from
the Department of Housing and Urban Development to explore new systems of public transit for ColNnbia and for a
study and demonstration of minibus operations as a means
of public transportation.
It is still too early to predict whether Reston and Columbia have
created forms of local government which will give residents a sense
of community and personal control over environment. A judgment as
to the success of these New Towns in creating q contemporary reality
for the "republic in miniature" ideal8 6 will have to wait at least until
the 1980's, when the developmental period will have ended. But, on
the basis of what has been written to date, one would gather that
Reston will not be promoting any kind of "participatory democracy."
The Home Owners Association is too much under the control of the
developer and too limited in its contemplated activities to be a locus
of active self-government. Moreover, the division of Reston into two
Home Owners Associations deprives the New Town of political integrity. Columbia's potential is .more reass~uring. Columbia has a
single Association that will carry on enough activities to capture the
interest of the residents, and the residents are guaranteed eventual
control over it. The village associations in addition, reflect a human
scale of community and may turn put to be a viable way to organize
a larger community into functional divisions. As a test tube for the
idea of decentralization, the Columbia experiment should be watched
carefully.
As a mechanism to "afford to the residents a voice in the affairs of
the c ity,"8. however, even the Colubia Association is open to criticism. The limitation of the franchise to property owners and tennt&-.
especially after the development period-may well be at variance with
democratic theory in this country, as embodied in recent decisions of
the Supreme Court. Whether or not New Towns are subject to constitutional requirements, the establishment of voting arrangements
within them which disregard these requirements casts a serious shadow
88
over the integrity of the governmental process in these communities.
88 The phrase is from R. WOOD, SUBURBIA 18 (1956). There is some evidence that
the "neighborhood unit" theories for new communities have not generated significant
community life in the British New Towns. Willmott, Social Research and New Communities, 33 J. Am. INsT. OF PLANNERS 387 (Nov. 1967).
87 See text accompanying note 60 supra.
88 The problem raised here is not academic. In fact, there are indications that
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"One unit-one vote" in the home owners' associations disfranchises
those who do not own property or (in Columbia) rent it. This voteless
class of residents could include young adults living with their parents,
spouses who do not hold jointly, older people sharing their children's
home, and perhaps others. And, because of the unanimous consent rule
for jointly-owned property, co-owners or co-tenants who cannot agree
on how to vote are also disfranchised. Finally, in Reston owners of
more than one dwelling unit may be permitted to cast more than one
vote, thereby diluting the weight of other individuals' single votes.
A. Equal Protection Requirements for Voting in Municipalities
If a public municipal government instead of a homes association
had voting qualifications like those in Reston and Columbia, it would
be subject to two lines of constitutional attack. First, property-either
ownership or tenancy-as a prerequisite for voting may be constitutionally invalid. Second, "one unit-one vote" favors the small household as against the large, in contravention of the standard established
in the reapportionment cases.
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections in 1966,9 the Supreme
Court held that a poll tax is invalid because of its inconsistency with
the equal protection clause. Building on Gray v. Sanders, 0 a reapportionment case, Justice Douglas noted that "neither homesite nor occupation affords a permissible basis for distinguishing between qualified
voters within the State." He added, "We think the same must be true
of requirements of wealth or affluence or payment of a fee."9 1
This decision has been interpreted by a three-judge federal district
court to imply that a statute which bars otherwise qualified voters from
voting on a proposed change in village government because they do
not own assessed property in the village violates the equal protection
clause.9 2 "Whether that change should be made affects all who live in
the Village so that denying the franchise to those who do not own
real property is an invidious discrimination."93
In another case, Landes v. Town of North Hempstead,94 the New
York Court of Appeals held that a town law which required a holder
Columbia residents, at least on the village level, are beginning to push for a "one man
-one vote" scheme. Columbia, Maryland, Times, Nov. 28, 1968 at 1.
89 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
90 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
91 383 U.S. at 667.
92 Pierce v. Village of Ossining, 292 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
93 Id. at 115.
94 Landes v. Town of North Hempstead, 20 N.Y.2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 120, 284 N.Y.S.2d
441 (1967).
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of elective office to be an owner of record of real property within the
town violated the equal protection clause. Chief Judge Fuld wrote:
In a society such as ours, characterized by its "mobility" and
"anonymity" . . . a landowner is no more likely to be permanently established in a town-and, by that token, better
qualified to govern-than one who is not a property owner.
*.. We suggest that it is impossible today to find any rational
connection between qualifications for administering town affairs and ownership of real property. 95
The opinion deals with office holders, but its reasoning could apply
equally to voters in local elections. It rests upon a finding that property
ownership is not a rational criterion for public participation. Two
district courts have taken a different view, however, distinguishing
elections for general governing bodies from narrower kinds of elections.
In Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,1 a 28 year-old
bachelor residing with his parents in their private home was not
allowed to register to vote in a school district election, because the Education Law of New York requires voters in such elections to be property owners, lessees, or parents with school-age children. Kramer argued that the statute resulted in discrimination based on property, or
wealth, violating the fourteenth amendment as interpreted in Harper
and Landes. A three-judge district court held, two to one, that the
equal protection clause did not apply. The school district election is
''a local election on limited issues as to which certain local residents
have a far greater direct interest than others. ' 97 This, the court said,
was an important difference from Harper and Landes, in which the
elections concerned general governing bodies whose decisions directly
affect all residents. It is not unreasonable for the legislature to determine that the local school system should be run by those who have
a direct interest in it-those who have to pay for it and those who
benefit from its services. On the other hand, Judge Weinstein's dissent
demonstrated in detail that every resident has a direct interest in the
educational system of the community, and that to exclude a citizen
from participation in this locus of government is to deprive him to a
significant degree of control over the total government of the nation.9 8
Judge Weinstein also suggested that the court erred in its belief that
95 20 N.Y.2d at 420, 231 N.E.2d at 122, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
06 282 F. Supp. 70 (E.D.N.Y.), cert. granted, 393 U.S. 818 (1968).
97 Id. at 74.
98 Id. at 76.
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a property qualification can be placed on voting, dven if it is reasonable. The Sipreme Ctiirt gfanted certioiari on October 14, 1968.
In Cipriano v. City of Houma, 9 a three-judge district court in
Louisiditia rdfused to diijdii th city? fk0fil isstiihg utility revetfue bonds
approvied by a vote 6f the pi-opetty tftxpaydks at a spedai election, holding that thei8 Wds no iiolatiOh of the equal protetion clausd because
the distinction drawn between resident voters who are property owners
and resident voters who do not own property is neither arbitrary nor
invidious. The court stressed that this was not an election for general
purposes, but one which merely concerned the administrative functions of the mtlnicipality,10 Circuit Judge Wisdom dissented, pointinlg
out that iii both Harperand Cipriano the eligibility to vote rested on
payment of a tat.101 Although he agreed that the question Was whether
the distittioi between prbperty and nonproperty owiers is rationals
his conclugioii was that Ha-pe requited a negative answer.
To summarize, undoubtedly a property qualification for the vote
will not be uphdld in an election f6di a general governing body. It is
also likely that such a qualification would fail in an election where
the outcome would affect all residents in a significant wayi even if
soxlla residehts would be affected more directly than others. However,
"significant" has not yet been given clear meaning by the Supreme
Court.. Its decisiofls in Kramet and Ciprianoshould throw light on that
problem. Whether a property qualification can be justified simply because it can be showri tO be reasonable isanother problem the Court
may decide. On the basis of Harper it would appear that the rationality of a property qualification is not at issue and that the real problem
is to get guidelineg for determining when a public decision-making
body exercises power in such a Way that all residents are affected
directly enough that exclltsion from participation is an invidious digz
ctimination.
Thus far, the discussion has emphasized that "one unit-6ne vote"
is wrong, Another approach to the problem would stress that "one
man--one Vote" is tight.
The rteapportionient pfinciple was applied to munidipal govern,
inents in the 1968 case of Avery vi Midland County,'0 2 Justice White
wrote:
r

heh the State delegates hdwiwakifig power t6 1oW govern-

iment afid provides iot the deetibn of 1O6al fficiabs from dis
99 286 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. La. 1968).
100 See discussion of Ai&Y d.bd Sailois tages in telt infra.
101 286 F. Supp. at 828.
102

390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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tricts specified by statute, ordinance, or local charter, it must
insure that those qualified to vote have the right to an equally
effective voice in the electipn proceg. 1Q- ,. We hold today
.ariat._n
only that the Constitution permits iro sibstntial
from equal population in drawing districts for units of local
government having general governmental powers over the en.tire geographic area served by the body.10 4
The Court stressed that the county government in question was a
unit with general governmental powers and noted that it was typical
of county, town, and village governments across the nation. This distinguished the case from Sailors v. Board of Education,10 5 decided in
1967, where it was held that since no election was required for members of a county board of education which performed essentially administrative functions, the principle of one man-one vote did not
apply, even though members were selected on the basis of one vote
for each local school board, regardless of population. The Court said
that this arrangement resulted in county board members being appointed, rather than elected, and no question of reapportionment was
presented. The later school board and revenue bond cases differ in
that elections were held.
Although Avery, like the other reapportionment cases, speaks to the
problem of unequal voting districts, the same considerations would
apply to individual voters whose votes have unequal weight. When
districts are unequal, it is the individual citizen's vote which is diluted
and debased, and he is the one, in the final analysis, who is guaranteed
equal protection of the laws. 08
The equal protection cases in the Supreme Court seem to indicate
that the judiciary should make an independent examination of the
reasonableness of a legislative classification which denies a group the
right to vote. 10 7 In this examination, it appears that no factor other
than unfitness to vote is a reasonable bar to voting rights. 0 8 That un103 Id. at 480.

104 Id. at 484-5.
105 387 U.S. 105 (1967).

108 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
107 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 282 F. Supp. at 75-87 (dissenting
opinion). See Carrington v. Rash, 530 U.S. 89 (1965). Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968). follows a similar tack as to qualification of candidates for the ballot. This ap

proach was followed by the majority in Kramer but not by that in Cipriano, which deferred to the wisdom of the legislature in barring non-property taxpayers from the vote.
108 Both fear of the voting patterns of disfranchised servicemen and difficulties of

proving residence were rejected as reasonable legislative considerations in Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 98-6 (1965). Similarly, all other considerations in reapportionment were

rejected except the "one man-one vote" principle in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553, 581
(1964).
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fitness may be measured only by inability to make a wise voting decision'09 or by disinterest in the subject matter of the election. 110
It follows from Harper and Avery that voting arrangements like
those adopted for Reston and Columbia would be unconstitutional for
a municipal government exercising general governmental, as opposed
to purely "administrative," powers. A general municipal government
cannot adopt a "one unit-one vote" scheme; it remains to. be seen
whether a private homes association is subject to similar constitutional
constraints.
B. The Applicability of Equal Protection Requirements to the New
Towns
In its New Town embodiment, the homes association closely resembles a municipal corporation. Like a municipal corporation, the New
Town homes associations described here are corporate and perpetual,
possess a taxing power, are established primarily to regulate the internal affairs of a geographic area for the benefit of the residents, and
are governed by elected bodies. Although lacking eminent domain
powers, they do have a kind of zoning power in their architectural
committees. Instead of a legislative charter, they operate under articles
of incorporation and recorded land agreements that have been approved and are enforced by agencies of the state.
Unlike the municipal corporation, the homes associations are private;
membership, at least in theory, is voluntary. Whereas all residents of
a municipality are members of the municipal corporation, only residents with a property interest are members of the homes association.
The constitutional question, therefore, is whether the similarities of
the homes association to a municipal government require the application of constitutional requirements to them, despite their "private"
character."'
This question has not been litigated. The applicability of the four109 Illiteracy, Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959), and conviction
for a felony, Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
US. 1048 (1967), and cases cited therein, have been held reasonable grounds for disfranchisement.
110 Residence is the outstanding example. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904). It
has also been assumed that the vote in special-purpose districts may be limited to those
assessed by the district because of its narrow purpose. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 15, 282 F. Supp. at 84 (dissent).
111 By barring lessees, the Reston voting scheme denies the vote to a group which
pays the property owner's dues in the association as part of its rents. The amount of the
dues has a direct impact on lessees to the extent that it is reflected in rents. The lessees
-and others excluded from the franchise in both Reston and Columbia-have an
interest in the maintenance of sidewalks, social activities, and other functions provided
by the home owners associations.

1969]

Democracy in the New Towns

teenth amendment to private organizations has arisen only in the context of first amendment rights or racial discrimination. The courts have
not been faced directly with the question of the constitutionality of
the internal structure of a private organization. 112 But they have been
called upon to determine when a "private" area becomes public for
first amendment purposes and when a "private" function becomes
public for equal protection purposes. These two lines of cases, neither
of which is without its problems, may cast some light on the susceptibility of New Town voting arrangements to constitutional attack.
1. The "Public Area" and the First Amendment. In 1946 Chickasaw, Alabama was a company town, wholly owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, with "all the characteristics of any other American town." It consisted of "residential buildings, streets, a system of
sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 'business block' on which business
places [were] situated." The town and its shopping district were "accessible to and freely used by the public in general and there [was]
nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center"
except their private ownership. A Jehovah's Witness was prosecuted
and convicted under the Alabama trespass law for attempting to distribute literature on a sidewalk of the business block in violation of a
company rule against solicitation on its property. In Marsh v. Alabama113 the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that private ownership is no justification for a state's "permitting a corporation
to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental
liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a
state statute."1

4

The Court's opinion, by Mr. Justice Black, stressed the importance
of first amendment freedoms for residents of company towns. They are,
he wrote, "free citizens of their state and country," who, like all other
citizens, "must make decisions which affect the welfare of community
and nation." To do so, "they must be informed," and, accordingly,
"their information must be uncensored." The corporate managers "cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of these people consistently
with the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees"; the application of
a state statute to enforce such action by criminal sanctions is unconstitutional. 115
112

Cf. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (Railway Labor Act

imposes a duty on a craft union to represent all members of the craft, but does not deny
the union the right to determine eligibility for membership), and concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Murphy, at 208-9.
113 326 US. 501 (1946).
114 Id. at 509.
115 Id. at 508.
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The Marsh test of ain area "freely ace-essible and open to the people
in the area and those pmgafig through" was tecently extended by the
Cout, in invalidating a state iijunction against peaceful non-employee
pie-keting of A piriVatelyzowned shopping center.1 16 The Court held that
access tW property "functioiig as a business district" for the purpose
of exercising first anienidmefit rights "should [not] be limited simply
because the property surroundifg the 'business district' is not under
the same ownership. ' 117 The state "may not delegate the power,
through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members
of the public Wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the
premises in a manner and fot a purpose generally consonant with the
use to which the property is actually put." 118
2. The "Public Function" and Equal Protection. Marsh and the
shopping center case dealt with the constitutionality of state court
enforcement of restrictions on speech in areas open to the public. But
Marsh contains language suggesting that the company itself was subject to fourteenth amendment limitations. Mr. Justice Black stated the
issue in the. case as folldWs:
[it is clear that had the people of Chickasaw owned all the
h6ihes, and all the stofes, and all the Streets, and all the sidewalks, all those owners t6gethef could frot hare set up a
municipal government with sufficient p6wers to pass an ordlnance completely barring the distribution of religious literature Our question then nafrows down to this: Can those
people who live in or come tO GhickisaW be denied freedom
of press and religion simply because a single company has
legal title to all the town?11 9
118 Amalgamated Food Employee. Union v. Logan Plaza, 891 U.S. 808 (1968).
11 Id. At 310.

118 Id. at 320. Cf. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society v. Metropolitan Life Ins, Co.,
297 N.Y. tD, 79 N.E.2d 43, cert. denied, 35 U.S. 886 (1948) (No violation of the fourteefith inendnient in Preventirig jehovah's Withesseg from distributing literature "inside
of, ifid into, tlib s.ireffl flbdfs ind inner hallways of multiple dwellings," here a private
residential community of high-rise apartmentd covering 129 acres and housing 35,000
people, with two public highways, private street lanes, and parks as well as shops, offices
and service stations run by tenants); Hall v. State, 188 Va. 72, 49 S.E-2d 369, appeal
dismissed, 835 U.S. 871 (1948); reachiiig the same conclusion with respect to a single
apartment building with sixty units. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in the thopping center
case, would apparently apply a "bird's-eye view" approach to define a "public area," even
in the first amendment context:
Under what circumstances can private property be treated as though it were
public? The answer that Marsh gives is when that property has taken on all
thd attributeg 6f d town, i.e., "k iddntil buildifigs, tredts, a system of sewers, a
sewage disposal plant, and a 'business block' on which busindss Piaces are
situated . . .
I can find nothing in Marsh which indicates that if one of these fkat res is
present ... this is sufficient...
8 U.S. at 382.
391
119 Marsh v. Alabama, 826 U.S. at 505.
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"Ownership," Mr. Justice Black wrote, "does not always mean absolute
dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in generali the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who
use it."' 12 Ownership, he argued, is not determinative of constitutional
rights:
Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the
town the public in either case has an identical interest in the
functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of communication remain free.
. [T]he town of
Chickasaw
does
not
function
differently
from any other
21
town.

Accordingly, constitutional rights are the same as in any other town.
This aspect of Marsh has been further developed in later cases, to
suggest a "public function" doctrine of state action for fourteenth
amendment purposes.1 22 The doctrine, ndever clearly articulated in the
case law, has two, not totally separable elements-the character of the
conduct by private parties and state involvement through delegation,
complicity, or inaction. 23 Both are reflected in the leading case suggesting the doctrine, EVans V,Newton:
Conduct that is formally "pri6Vate" may become so entwined
with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action. ...A town may
be privately owned and managed, but that does not necessarily allow the company to treat it as if it were wholly in
the private sector. Thus we held in Marsh v. Alabama . ..
that the exercise of constitutionally protected rights on the
public streets of a company town could not be denied by the
owner .... We have also held that where a State delegates
an aspect of the elective process to private groups, they become subject to the same restraints as the State. Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461. That is to say, when private individuals
or groups are eridoWed by the State with powers or functions
governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen120 Id. at

566.

121 Id. at 507-8.
122 "[The action inhibited by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only
such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 13 (1948).
123 See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 45 U.S. 461 (193); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944), holding that voting in Democratic primaries was such an integral part of the
electoral process that delegation of state control to the Democratic Party served to make
the Party's action that of the state, thereby subjecting it to constitutional requirements.
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talities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations.124

Other statements of the "public function" approach to state action
also utilize these two elements, professing to derive them from Marsh.
In arguing that the constitution requires that public acconmodations be desegregated, Mr. Justice Douglas found support in Marsh,
which he read to stand for the proposition that privately-owned towns
"perform municipal functions and are held to the same constitutional
requirements as ordinary municipalities."'- 25 Mr. Justice Goldberg,
making a similar argument, cited Marsh, among other cases, for the
principle that "state conduct which might be described as 'inaction'
can nevertheless constitute responsible 'state action' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 26 In dissent in the shopping
center case, 127 Mr. Justice White argued that in Marsh, "the company

ran an entire town and the state was deemed to have devolved upon
the company the task of carrying out municipal functions";128 the
124 582 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). Evans involved the constitutionality of a state court appointment of private parties to replace the city of Macon, Georgia as trustees of a tract
of land which had been devised to the city in trust in 1911 for use as a park for white
people only. The city had taken the position that it could not maintain the park on a
segregated basis. The Court held that the transfer to private trustees was unconstitutional. There were alternate bases for the holding, aside from "public function." For
years the park was "an integral part" of the city's activities; the "momentum it acquired
as a public facility [was] certainly not dissipated ipso facto by the appointment of
'private' trustees." Id. at 301. There was no indication on the record that the city did not
continue to. maintain the facility; "[ilf the municipality remains entwined in the management or control of the park, it remains subject to the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
Moreover, the state had held that it had equitable power to appoint new trustees to
assure that the purpose of the trust-the provision, of a park for whites only--did not
fail. Id. at 298. See also id. at 302-12 (White, J., concurring).
In dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan argued that the "public function" test lacked any "firm
doctrinal support," id. at 321, and had "perverse potentialities" as to "a host of . . .
functions commonly regarded as nongovernmental though paralleling fields of governmental activity." Id. at 322. On the first point, he found Marsh to be the only "Fourteenth Amendment case finding state action in the 'public function' performed by a
technically private institution." Id. at 320. He belittled the significance of the Marsh
doctrine, indicating that it "has not since been the basis of other decisions in this Court
and certainly it has not been extended." Id. at 321.
125 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 181 (1961) (concurring).
126 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 310-1 (1964). See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369, 384 (1967) (Douglas, J. concurring): "Zoning is a state and municipal function ....
When the state leaves that function to private agencies or institutions which are licensees
and which practice racial discrimination and zone our cities into white and black belts
or . . . ghettoes, it suffers a governmental function to be performed under private
auspices in a way the state itself may not act."
127 Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Plaza, 391 US. at 337.
128 Id. at 340.
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company "stood in the shoes of the state in attempting to prevent the
streets from being used as public streets are normally used."'129
The United States, in its amicus brief in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.,13O advanced this "public function" argument as grounds for holding that it was unconstitutional for the developer of a private subdivision of about ore thousand residents to refuse to sell a lot to a
Negro because of his race. The subdivision, Paddock Woods, was
planned as a complete suburban community and was controlled by a
board of trustees appointed by the developer. The government argued
that
respondents, in operating their new community, act in much
the same manner as a municipal corporation. They begin by
establishing community boundaries, with the review and approval of the State. With State review and approval they
establish streets, sewers, and recreational facilities--services
the public has come to expect from its municipal governments. They establish rules which the residents of the community must follow and which the State enforces. They appoint a governing body.... They furnish continuing services,
such as rubbish collection, and levy assessments-enforceable
by judicial process-to pay for the services .... And these acts
are done under the supervision of a complex structure of
district, county, and State agencies, under the State law....131
The government suggested analogies between the subdivision's architectural controls and municipal zoning ordinances, and between the
subdivision's assessments and public taxes, drawing the conclusion
that "those who rule the community, although they wear no uniform
and hold no official title, wield those powers to perform essentially
'3 2
governmental functions.'
The courts have never had to extend the public function doctrine
this far. In Jones itself, the Supreme Court avoided the constitutional
issue by holding that the discrimination violated a Reconstruction
statute Congress had the power to enact under the thirteenth amend129 Id. at 337. See also Guillory v. Administration of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855,
859 (E.D. La. 1962), where Judge Skelly Wright argued: "Clearly, the administrators of
a private college are performing a public function. They do the work of the state, often
in the place of the state. Does it not follow that they stand in the state's shoes? And, if
so, are they not the agents of the state, subject to the constitutional restraints on governmental action, to the same extent as private persons who govern a company town... ?"
130 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
131 Brief for Plaintiff as Amicus Curiae at 7-8.
132 Id.

at 14.
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ment. 3 And the earlier line of sit-in cases, in which "public function"
arguments for imping a cottutiona duty
,to ipsinat@ on
store¢owners hld bee adv.qed 5 ene4 with the passage 9f te piublic
Aicpmmodatiqns provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The Supreme Court in Marsh had to aecjde whether prvate town

ws the equivalent gf a public towl for first amendment purposes. It
decided that it was, and the opinion in that case has led to two doctri-nes, bpth pf which have been extended well beyord private towns.
One deals with the natqre pf areas open tp the public; while geographically oriented, it is of little relevance to the question of whether
a New Town must be organized with a democratic form of government. The other, which has never served as the sole basis of a Supreme
Court holding, deals with functions; while ostensibly concerned with
whether an activity is goyepmental in character

it has not been

utilized to suggest that the internal structure of the organization administering the function must meet constitutional standards, but only
that the function must be administered ini a non-discriminatory manner.

34

"Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote
is undermined," the Supreme Court has said.las Indeed, in Marsh the
Court was concerned about maintaining a free flow of information
to citizens of company towns so that they could properly exercise their
responsibilities to "'make decisions which affect the welfare of com-

punity and nation " even though tbey did not elect the company
officials who ran their town.
I an be argued from the primacy of the Tight to vote, and the
combination of the Marsh and Evans doctrines. that New Towns
should be subject to equa! protection standards in allocating the
133 392 U.S. 409 (1968). On this case, see Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Confused and
Braysed M!se, 1968 S. CT. R1v 8m.
134 Marsh also suggests a third doctripe-the public interest in the functioning of the
private entity. In Marsh, the Court said, "Whether a corporation or a municipality owns
or possesses the town, the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the qnorunijy. . ." 326 U.S. at 507 (italics added), (The fuIll sentence ls quoted
above in the text accompanying note 121.) This implies an equal protection analogue
of the doctrine of property "affected with a public interest," the due process test for the
constitutionality of state regulation of a business. Chief Justice Waite stated the test in
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 118, 126 (1876), as follows: f"Property does become clothed with
a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the
community at large." In their sit-in opinions, justices Douglas and Goldberg urged the
application of thi doctrine in the equal protection area. See Bell v. Maryland, 878 U.S.
226, 312-5 (1964) (concurring opinion); Lombard v. Louisiana, 873 U.S. 267, 274-8 (1968)
(concurring opinion). See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.. 369, 38-6 (1967) (concurring
opinion).
135 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
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franchise. Like Chickasaw, New Towns have "all the characteristics
of any other American town"; like the park in Macon, "the predominant character and purpose" of the homes associations in New
3 6 If
Towns "are municipal."1this argument is accepted and if, as suggested above, "one unit-.--one vote" is constitutionally impermissible,
then the covenanted voting arrangements might be judicially overturned and the franchise opened to all residents.137
It is not difficult to imagine circumstances under which a case could
arise that would bring the New Town voting arrangements into the
courts. Perhaps the excluded residents would find themselves directly
affected by an approaching homes association election and would seek
an injunction against the enforcement of the property requirements
and a decree that all otherwise qualified voters be permitted to vote on
the principle of one man-one vote. 13§ Such an order would have the
effect of setting aside only the clauses of the land agreements and
articles of incorporation which pertain to wfio can vote in a central
180 This is not to suggest that a New Town must have an elected government, but
only that if it does, the "one unit-one vote" standard may be impermissible. To paraphrase Avery, when there is a provision for election of local officials, those qualified to
vote have the right to an equally effective voice in the election prpcess. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
Moreover, not all homes associations (in New Towns or other communities) should
necessarily be required to open the franchise to all residents merely because they perform some ' public fupction." "Private governmeits" should be distinguished from private
entities performing a single public function? and New Town associations like those
described in this comment from limited-purpose subdivision homes associations. Cf.
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Pierce v. Village of Ossining, 292 F. Supp.
118 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 282 F. Supp. 70
(E.D.N.Y.), cert. granted, 393 U.S. 818 (1968). Among the criteria that are relevant in
making this distinction are the extent of the municipal-type services performed by the
association, the size (both in population and area) of the community it services, and the
importance of the services to residents excluded from the franchise. Finally, it may be
useful to apply the gestalt apprpach suggested by Marsh. Does the community served by
the associatiog hook like a town? A definition like that qupted in note 6 supra may be
usefully applied in answering the question.
137 There are, of course, other methods of organizing the "political" structure of the
New Towns. In California, for instance, the establishment of special districts by developers has been widely favored. Under this procedure, owvner control is assured for a
period of time because two of the three directors of such a district are elected by
property owners on the basis of the assessed value of their holdings. Because this type
of government may lead to conflict between the developer and the residents, measures
have been initiated to stem abuses by the developers. For example, local agency boundary
commissions, representing counties, cities within the county, and the public now play a
positive role in the development of appropriate governmental organization for urban
areas. See ACIR 91-3.
1as In Pierce v. Village of Ossining, 292 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the district court
enjoined the operation of a statutory property requirement so that aU who wished to
vote in the scheduled election could do so.
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homes association election. These clauses are severable, 139 and their
invalidation would not upset the entire covenant structure.
It is conceivable that a court would not stop with the voting arrangement but would import the entire Constitution into its decision,
invalidating the requirement that office holders be members of the
association and looking into such other problems as due process, impeachment, and amendments. Moreover, it is possible that a court
could decide that the private government is a sham municipal corporation, and in violation of state law in regard to municipal corporations. At this early date, however, when there is almost no knowledge of how the New Towns will actually operate politically, such a
decision would be unfortunate and unnecessary. Instead of finding that
these private governments are in fact municipal corporations, it should
be sufficient to say that they resemble municipal corporations. This
distinction would permit a case-by-case determination of how far
policy requires incorporation of the Constitution.140
In other words, the finding of a court that New Towns must open
up the franchise to all residents would not impose a new burden on
developers and planners to create a different form of government. The
provisions on voting could still be written into land agreements, with
the understanding that such provisions will not be enforced by the
courts. Or, if this would foster unnecessary litigation, future covenants
could specify that the franchise will be open to all residents, either
from the beginning or after a certain date. Such provisions might not
meet with the wholehearted approval of prospective home owners,
who would desire the same amount of control over their neighborhood
as they might have obtained by purchasing in a small subdivision with
a small homes association that provides few or no services. This loss
of power, however, appears to be a small price to pay for the benefits
and amenities which a New Town homes association can provide.
Moreover, if the vote is opened up only on the central homes association level, where general governing powers are exercised, the property
owners could still maintain full control at the peripheral level, where
the homes association's activities are limited to those traditionally
carried on by small subdivision homes associations. In order to assure
that courts will not find that village and cluster associations perform
public functions, developers would be wise to follow the Columbia
model of making village association dues voluntary and unenforceable.
139 Deed, supra note 59, § 7.02; Deed of Dedication, supra note 46, IV(ll).
140 Such a case-by-case determination would be in accordance with the suggestion
(see note 134 supra) that there is a "public interest" element in Marsh and perhaps in

the public function area as well.
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The foregoing discussion assumes that the litigated case arises at a
time when the New Town is a going operation, when it resembles
an ordinary town. What changes are introduced if the case arises during the developmental period? It would be possible to argue, given
the continuum of private and public, that the New Town only gradually assumes its public function status, and that during the early years
it is still essentially private, and necessarily so as a pragmatic matter,
if the developer is to be given the amount of influence he needs in
order to protect the success of his venture. As a corollary, it could be
said that the development-stage homes association is indeed a semidemocratic facade, because it is intended to serve not as a general
governing body of the residents, but as an administrative device of
the developer. Thus, the developer could maintain his own weighted
voting power and could allocate the other votes as he deems advisable
in order to assure planned development and gradual transition of
control to the residents. The argument would continue: at a certain
point in time the metamorphosis of the homes association from an
administrative device to a governing body occurs, and at that point,
it would bear sufficient resemblance to a municipal corporation to
justify extension of the franchise to all residents. Such an argument
-which would relegate early residents to a status of tutelage-seems
unavoidable if we are committed to the building of New Towns by
private developers.
This would be a departure from democratic ideals, and, if accepted,
should be accompanied by safeguards. Developers should be required
-by legislative or judicial action-to specify a reasonable developmental period (from seven to fifteen years, for example) which would
define the outer temporal boundary of benevolent paternalism. Perhaps an administrative organ of the state is needed to monitor the
development period and to set a schedule for the withering away of
the developer in each New Town. On the other hand, it was suggested
above 141 that the developer has an economic interest in the transfer of
community control to the property owners. If things do, in fact, work
out this way, the difficulties will be minimized during the developmental period. Present experiments should be studied to see how the
developers behave. If it is assured that the developmental period will
come to an end within a reasonable time, and if the Constitution
is interpreted to provide the usual political rights after the develop141 See text accompanying note 71 supra. Congress ignored the recommendation of the
president of the National Housing Conference when he testified that, "There is a need
for a governmental unit in the locality which would have all the governmental powers,
functions, and responsibilities of the New Town." Hearings,supra note 15, pt. 1, at 414-5.
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mental period, the privately developed New Town could grbw and
eXist without a severe or prolonged deprivation of public rights
IV.

GONCLUSiOr4

Although it is not elaimed that Reston and Cohimbia die typical of
all New Towns in their form of government, these two growing cities
ard important models for future community building. Both have governments that combine public services from the county level with
municipal-type services provided by private homes assodiatiOns. Both
New Towns have experimented With federal arrangements for their
homes associatiofis, utilizing peripheral units to promote decentralized,
local control over the immediate environment. The central homes
associations carry on a variety of activities which affect all residents,
and a strong case can be made foi the position that the fourteenth
amendment is applicable. If this is correct, the property basig of political participation in Reston and Columbia may violate the equal protection clause. Even if the COnstitutiofn is t6t relevant to these New
Towns, the use of private corporations in place of municipal government raises important policy questions which have not yet received
legislative consideration.

